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marginal costs of one hour of commuting are about 17 euro.  
 
Keywords: On-the-job search; Job moving; Commuting time; Commuting cost; Willingness-to-
pay 
JEL code: R20, J32 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the current paper, we aim to estimate workers' marginal costs of commuting. These costs 
include mainly travel time costs and monetary costs, but they may also include other costs that 
affect the utility of travel (e.g., stress, risk of accidents). Commuting costs play an important role 
in hundreds of studies that contribute to urban economics theory (e.g., Wheaton, 1974; Fujita, 
1989). In the Alonso-Muth-Mills monocentric model, commuting costs not only determine urban 
spatial structure – by influencing the size of the city – they also determine whether a city is 
monocentric at all (Ogawa and Fujita, 1980; Fujita and Ogawa, 1982), and generally they will 
determine land, and therefore house, prices, as well.1 However, it turns out that we know 
surprisingly little about the size of these commuting costs. 
A large number of transport economics studies focus on the time component of 
commuting costs (e.g., Small et al., 2005). Estimates of the time component of commuting costs 
vary by a large margin, but studies tend to find that the value of travel time is 20% to 100% of 
the hourly (gross) wage (Small, 1992). De Borger and Fosgerau (2008) find strong reference-
point effects in stated preference data and suggest a way to correct for this effect. Revealed 
preference studies tend to find substantially higher values than stated preference studies.2 
                                                          
1 Commuting costs are also relevant to other economics fields, such as labour economics, because these 
costs affect the cost of being employed, and therefore workers' labour supply (e.g., Wales, 1978; Cogan, 
1981; Parry and Bento, 2001), as well as workers' reservation and realised wages (e.g., Van den Berg, 
1992; Van den Berg and Gorter, 1997, Manning, 2003a; 2003b). 
2 The majority of (transport economics) studies that assess the costs associated with travel time are based 
on actual commuters' mode and route choices (Miller, 1989; Small, 1992; Hensher, 1997 and Small et al., 
2005). There are likely, however, some serious problems with these studies, with regard to correlation 
between travel time and cost, and the difficulty of measuring the travel time and cost associated with 
different travel alternatives. A related technique avoids these problems by exploiting subjective response 
data on choices among hypothetical trip or mode alternatives that differ in time and cost components (see 
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Although the time component is an important part of the commuting costs, the other components 
are not negligible, and may therefore not be ignored (Cogan, 1981). For commuters, the 
monetary costs are thought to be about 30% to 40% of the time costs (e.g., Fujita, 1989; Small, 
1992). Furthermore, workers may vary the speed of their commute through their choice of travel 
mode, so the share of the time costs as part of the total commuting costs is endogenously 
determined. As a consequence, information on the costs of the time component is not necessarily 
informative about the total commuting costs. 
For all travel modes except car use, the marginal monetary costs are easy to determine. 
For non-motorized transport (bicycling, walking), the marginal monetary costs are (close to) 
zero; for public transport (train, bus, metro), the marginal monetary costs can be derived from the 
price paid for the ticket. For car users, however, who are the majority of commuters, the 
marginal monetary costs associated with commuting are not so straightforward to determine. 
These costs of car use comprise not only the variable costs of car use (fuel, depreciation of the 
car due to its use), but also costs that are related to the ownership of the car (interest, insurance, 
etc). The latter cost component is frequently treated as fixed, and it is therefore assumed not to 
affect workers' marginal costs of travel. This may be argued to be a relevant assumption in the 
United States, where car availability is high and almost all workers commute by car. Outside the 
United States, the proportion of workers who commute by car is much smaller. For example in 
the Netherlands, approximately 50% of workers commute by car. Car ownership decisions will 
frequently depend on the length of the commuting distance, which constitutes about one third of 
a car's mileage (De Jong, 1990). Consequently, even though treating car ownership costs as fixed 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Hensher, 1997; Verhoef et al., 1997; Calfee and Winston, 1998; Fosgerau, 2005). With such data, the 
problems of revealed preference data are eliminated by design. However, this advantage is gained at the 
cost of introducing a range of biases related to the hypothetical nature of data (McFadden 1999). 
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may make sense with respect to some travel decisions, these costs are clearly not fixed with 
respect to commuting.3 
Workers' marginal commuting costs can be derived in various ways. One method, 
familiar to labour economists, is to use the trade off between wages and the length of the 
commute, using hedonic wage models, as developed by Rosen (1986), see for example Zax 
(1991). But such a method has a number of disadvantages, as it relies on the (implicit) 
assumption that workers have full information about availability of jobs and do not have to 
search for jobs (Hwang et al., 1992; Hwang et al., 1998; Gronberg and Reed, 1994). A number of 
studies have shown that estimates of valuation of job attributes, such as commuting time, are 
likely seriously downward-biased if hedonic wage models are used (Gronberg and Reed, 1994; 
Van Ommeren et al., 2000; Villanueva, 2007).  An alternative method is to rely on the trade off 
between house prices and commuting (which implicitly also relies on Rosen, 1986). For certain 
relatively simple spatial structures of cities with well-defined workplace centres, such as Hong 
Kong, this method seems promising (see Tse and Chan (2003) and Yiu and Tam (2007)). For 
complex urban structures, such as in the Netherlands, application of this method seems difficult. 
In this paper, we estimate commuting costs based on actual on-the-job search, as well as 
                                                          
3 In addition to monetary and time commuting cost, there are other cost components. For example, given 
the presence of a car in the household, the use of the car for commuting imposes opportunity costs on 
other members within the same household who do not have simultaneous access to the use of the car. 
There is also a large literature in psychology that suggests that the psychological costs of travel are 
substantial (for a review, see Koslowsky et al., 1995). For example, long commutes increase blood 
pressure, physical disorders and anxiety. Further, long commutes are thought to have adverse effects on a 
worker's mood, as well as on cognitive performance. Economics literature on the psychological costs of 
commuting indicates that these costs are relevant (Kahneman et al., 2004; Stutzer and Frey, 2004). As 
most of the psychological costs of travel increase with travel time, it is not necessary to deal with these 
costs separately. 
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job moving, behaviour. Workers' marginal commuting costs will be derived from data on job 
search and job moving behaviour, employing a dynamic job search approach.4 Our paper relates 
to a number of studies that have estimated the implied value of job attributes using data on job 
moving behaviour (Herzog and Schlottmann, 1990; Gronberg and Reed, 1994; Manning, 2003b; 
Dale-Olsen, 2006) and job search behaviour (Van Ommeren and Hazans, 2008).5 It is also 
loosely related to the approach introduced by Bartik et al. (1992) who estimated the value of 
residential characteristics based on residential moving behaviour.  
The dynamic job search approach assumes that workers are not in their preferred 
(welfare-maximising) job due to imperfect information about other jobs, but workers are able to 
improve their welfare over time by searching for other jobs, and by moving to other jobs if a job 
is found that increases welfare. This approach uses the implicit trade off between commuting 
time and wage, which affects both on-the-job-search and job moving behaviour, to determine 
workers' marginal costs of travel.6 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
4 This approach avoids some strong assumptions underlying discrete choice-based estimates based on 
actual route or mode choices, including the assumption that the choice set of the worker is accurately 
observed, and that the characteristics of the travel alternatives not chosen by the commuter are accurately 
observed. It also avoids the fundamental assumption, common in transport studies, that a change in mode 
affects only the costs and times associated with these modes. Such an assumption may be very restrictive, 
as it ignores, for example, changes in convenience (see, e.g., Calfee and Winston, 1998). 
5 Isacsson and Swärdh (2007) estimate the value of commuting time based on the duration of 
employment, using strong assumptions regarding the choice of transport mode and the related costs. 
6 The reader may wonder whether a method that relies on the trade off between wages and commuting 
time, and therefore measures the long-run marginal costs of commuting, generates results that are 
comparable to methods, common in transport economics, that measure the short-run marginal costs of the 
time component. At least theoretically, the answer is yes. One of the standard micro-economics results is 
that long-run and short-run marginal costs are equal (because the long-run and short-run average curves 
are tangent, see Varian, 1992). Our dynamic search model has the same property. 
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Our study is related to studies that focus on the compensation workers receive, in the 
labour market, for commuting (e.g., Zax, 1991; Van Ommeren et al., 2000; Manning, 2003a; 
Van Ommeren and Hazans, 2008). Typically, these studies use either commuting time or 
distance as an approximation for commuting costs. This is not justified, but is seen as a 
restriction of the available data set. Intuitively, if commuting costs mainly consist of time costs, 
then the use of commuting time is preferred. On the other hand, if there exist large (unobserved) 
differences in speed, for example due to congestion, then commuting distance may be the 
preferred measure. The two measures are equivalent only if the commuting speed is fixed and 
constant across the population. In the current paper, we apply a dynamic search model approach, 
and measure commuting costs based on commuting time. The use of commuting time, when 
commuting distance is not observed, will be justified theoretically by allowing for endogenously 
chosen speed. Hence, we will measure the costs of commuting in terms of time.7 
Although the dynamic search model approach has a number of fundamental advantages, 
it has also a number of disadvantages (Gronberg and Reed, 1994; Manning, 2003b). One of the 
main drawbacks of the dynamic search model approach is that one must assume identical utility 
functions across workers, and the literature remains suspicious as to what extent this assumption 
biases the results (e.g., see the seminal paper by Gronberg and Reed, 1994). This criticism can be 
(partially) addressed by means of panel data techniques; these techniques have not been applied 
previously in this context. In the current paper, we will show that the results remain robust, using 
panel data techniques. 
Note that although we are aware of various studies that use either the job mobility or the 
                                                          
7 We believe that such a measure is generally more useful than a measure in terms of distance, for 
international comparisons. One notable characteristic of commuting time (and not of distance) is that the 
nationwide average commuting time is hardly time-varying (see Van Ommeren and Rietveld, 2005). 
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job search approach to estimate the value of job attributes, this is the first study that applies both 
approaches to the same data set. Both approaches rely on the same underlying dynamic search 
model, so they should (if applied correctly) generate the same estimate of the value of job 
attributes. Another potential advantage is to estimate joint models of job search and mobility. In 
our application, though, it turns out that joint models of job search and mobility generate 
identical results to separate models of job search and mobility, without any gain in the efficiency 
of the estimates. Throughout the paper, we will provide the results for the separate models, and, 
discuss soon the estimates of the joint model, when discussing the robustness of the analysis. 
Although the underlying assumptions of the search and mobility approaches are the same, 
the job search approach is easier to apply, since the job mobility approach requires information 
on voluntary job mobility – information that is frequently not available in surveys. One may 
avoid this issue by making the additional assumption that the job attribute does not affect the 
involuntary job-quitting rate (see Van Ommeren and Hazans (2008) for details). In the context of 
our study, this does not turn out to be problematic, because it seems reasonable to assume that 
the length of the commute does not affect the involuntary job-quitting rate. Hence, given 
estimates from both approaches, we are able to test whether the two approaches are consistent 
with each other in their empirical implementation. Given consistency, estimates of the different 
approaches can be pooled, enabling one to reduce the standard errors of the pooled estimate. 
The outline of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we introduce a job search model 
(allowing for commuting costs), specify the appropriate utility function, and derive workers' 
marginal willingness-to-pay for commuting costs. The empirical results are discussed in section 
3. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
 
2. THEORETICAL MODEL 
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2.1 Short-run behaviour 
Consider an employed individual who lives forever. In the short run, the worker’s residence and 
workplace locations, and therefore the commuting distance D, are exogenously given. Also, in 
the short run, she derives utility from job attributes X by the quasi-concave instantaneous utility 
function v(X). The estimation method we use to estimate workers' value of job attributes applies 
to any quasi-concave utility function v(X). However, in the context of commuting, for estimation 
and interpretation purposes, it is useful to specify v(X) in more detail. 
We assume that v(X) = v(Y,L), where Y is income and L denotes leisure time. Income Y 
is equal to wH-c, where w is the hourly wage, H is the number of hours worked and c denotes the 
monetary commuting costs.8 Leisure time is equal to L H t− − , where L  is the total time 
available and t is the commuting time.9 We presume that commuting speed, and, therefore, 
commuting time t, as well as hours of work H, are optimally chosen. 
We consider commuting distance to be produced according to the production function d, 
which takes money and travel time as inputs. We assume that this production function is strictly 
increasing and strictly concave, such that the isoquants are strictly convex. Since the commuting 
distance is exogenously given, we require that: 
D=d(c,t), (1) 
where dc>0 and dt>0.  
The commuter’s utility maximisation problem is now to maximise ( ,v wH c L H t− − − )
                                                          
 
with respect to H and t, subject to (1), which has the following first-order conditions: wvY=vL, 
8 Hence, in this model, the individual consumes leisure time, pays for the costs of the commute, c, and 
spends wH-c on other consumption goods. 
9 In this specification, we impose that travel time has no leisure time component. Including such a 
component, so that leisure time is equal to L H tγ− − , where 0 < γ ≤ 1, does not change the results. 
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vY=λdc, and vL=λdt, where λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the distance constraint.10 
Together, these first-order conditions imply that wdc=dt. Further, it appears that, by the envelope 
theorem, ∂v/∂w=vYH. Consider, now, the optimally-chosen cost and time to be a function of the 
distance and differentiate (1); thus, we find that 1=dccD+dttD. This also implies that ∂v/∂D=-
vY/dc. The marginal willingness-to-pay (MWP), to reduce optimally-chosen commuting time, is 
now defined as: 
/ 1 1 1
/ D c D t D
v D wMWP
v w t Hd t H d t
∂ ∂= = − = −∂ ∂ . (2) 
Hence, the MWP is negative and numerically greater than w/H, provided that 
0<1/(dttD)<1. The latter constraint holds when both cD>0 and tD>0 (because dc>0 and dt>0). 
This is a requirement on the expansion path of d; the curve formed by points (c,t), satisfying 
wdc(c,t)=dt(c,t), can be represented by (c(t),t), where c(t) is an increasing function of t. Another 
way of stating this is that increasing distance, and maintaining a constant marginal rate of 
technical substitution between cost and time, requires increasing input of both cost and time.11 
In summary, we have –MWP=αw/H, where α=1/(dttD)>1. This measure may be 
interpreted as the total marginal costs of commuting associated with commuting time. It 
measures the increase in wage that is necessary to compensate for an optimally-chosen increase 
in commuting time, given an increase in distance. An optimally-chosen increase in commuting 
time corresponds to an increase in distance, as well as in monetary costs. Hence, as implied by 
(2), this measure exceeds the MWP for commuting time that ignores monetary commuting costs. 
                                                          
10 These first-order conditions are standard. For example, the condition wvY=vL implies that wage is the 
opportunity cost of leisure. 
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In fact, fixing monetary commuting costs, and given optimal working hours (as, for example, 
assumed by Manning, 2003a), the MWP = -vL/(vYH) = -w/H, which is smaller (in absolute value) 
than -αw/H, as α>1.  
We have described distance as being produced according to a continuous production 
function, which is in contrast to the discrete models typically used in the transport literature (the 
main exception is DeSalvo and Huq, 2005). In favour of the continuous formulation stands the 
fact that the choice of how to go to work, and hence the time and cost, involves, in general, much 
more than a simple discrete-mode choice. There are a multitude of choices – including some 
continuous choices. Consider, e.g., the possibilities for combining different modes (Van Exel and 
Rietveld, 2004), choosing departure time in situations of peak-hour congestion, choosing 
between slow and fast routes, car drivers choosing speed and driving style, choosing between 
cars with different costs, etc. (Rouwendal, 1996; Rienstra and Rietveld, 1996; Verhoef and 
Rouwendal, 2001; Gander, 1985; Rotemberg, 1985). It should be noted, however, that the result 
that -MWP=αw/H>w/H may also be derived under the antithetical assumption that commuting 
cost and time are fixed as functions of commuting distance, as long as commuting cost and time 
increase in distance.12 Thus the analysis in this paper remains valid also for this case where the 
commuter is restricted to just one transport mode with a given cost and speed. 
Given an optimally-chosen combination of commuting time and working hours, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
11 A necessary and sufficient condition for this property to hold, for any w, is that djjdi<dijdj for i≠j, i,j=c,t. 
These conditions imply convexity and hence are stronger. Proof of these assertions is available from the 
authors upon request.  
12 This is easy to show, using the same argument as above. We require that cost and time are increasing 
differentiable functions of distance. 
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expression for instantaneous utility may be rewritten as v(wH-αwt).13 Therefore, instantaneous 
utility depends on the daily wage wH, as well as on the interaction between the hourly wage w 
and the commuting time t. Our main interest is to estimate the unknown coefficient α, as it 
determines workers' MWP, given information on H and w. We will see now that the MWP can 
be derived from both observations of on-the-job search and from observations of job moving. 
 
2.2 Long-run behaviour: search and moving decisions 
The worker either searches (s = 1) or does not search (s = 0), in the labour market. Search costs 
are equal to k(s), and jobs arrive at rate p(s). When searching, p(1) = p > 0 and k(1) = k > 0, 
when not searching, p(0) = 0 and k(0) = 0. Job attribute offers X0 are drawn randomly from a 
given distribution, which is independent of current job attribute X. Pooling of offers is not 
allowed: job offers are either refused or accepted before other offers arrive. For convenience, we 
ignore involuntary job mobility into unemployment. Van Ommeren and Hazans (2008) show 
how the results are affected when allowing workers to become unemployed. In the current 
application, allowing for unemployment does not change the results, as it seems reasonable to 
assume that commuting time does not determine involuntary job mobility. 
The individual is assumed to maximise lifetime utility V, discounting future utility at the 
rate ρ. The expected lifetime utility V(X), conditional on the current job, includes the possibility 
of job offers in the future. The decision whether to accept a job offer accounts for expected 
future offers. Discounted lifetime utility can then be written as the sum of the instantaneous 
utility and the expected benefit of accepting a job offer during the next time period. It is assumed 
                                                          
13 Note that ∂v/∂w=vYH and [∂v/∂D]/tD=-vYwα, so v=v(wH-αwt) is consistent with these first-derivatives. 
Note further that v(wH-αwt) represents the same preferences as, for example, v(log(wH-αwt)), where log 
denotes the natural logarithm. This issue will be addressed later on. 
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that each period is infinitely small, so calendar time is continuous. This leads to the following 
well-known equation: 
 
]0),()(max[)()()()( 0 XVXVEspskXvXV −+−=ρ , (3) 
 
where expectation is formed with respect to the distribution of the job offer attribute X0. The 
interpretation of this formula is well known (see, e.g., Mortensen, 1986). Current utility equals 
v(X)-k(s). A job offer will be received at a rate p(s) and the offer will be accepted if the value of 
the new job exceeds that of the current one. Hence, the optimal acceptance strategy is to accept a 
job offer only if V(X0)-V(X) > 0. 
 The optimal-choice search decision is obtained by maximising (2), with respect to s. It 
can easily be seen that: 
 
s = 1    if ; kXVXVpE ≥− ]0),()(max[ 0
s = 0    otherwise. (4) 
 
Hence, if s = 1, then the expected benefits of search exceed the search costs. 
In the previous subsection, we have shown that X includes two job attributes: the wage w 
as well as the commuting time t. Workers' MWP for commuting time is defined as the ratio of 
the marginal instantaneous utility of commuting time t over the marginal instantaneous utility of 
wage w, so MWP = [∂v(X)/∂D.tD-1]/[∂v(X)/∂w]. Note that k and p are not observed, and (4) can 
be rewritten as s = 1 if Emax[V(X0)-V(X),0] ≥ k/p, so k/p can be considered (unobserved) random 
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error from the point of view of the econometrician.14 It can then be demonstrated that (using the 
same steps as Van Ommeren and Hazans, 2008): 
 
1Pr( 1) Pr( 1)/D
s sMWP t
D w
−∂ = ∂ == ∂ ∂ , (5) 
 
where Pr(s = 1) denotes the probability that the worker is searching for another job. Hence, 
workers' MWP is equal to the ratio of the marginal effects of commuting time and wage on the 
probability of job search. This result is intuitive: commuting time and wage both affect the utility 
of the worker. Workers use the trade-off between commuting time and wage to determine their 
optimal search – and therefore moving – behaviour. 
Job offers will only be accepted if V(X0)-V(X) > 0, otherwise the job offer will be 
rejected. The moving rate, θ, is equal to the job arrival rate p(s) times the probability that the job 
offer will be accepted. In our application, as is quite common, we only observe if at least one job 
move occurs during a fixed time interval (in our application, two years). So, it is more 
straightforward to use the job moving probability, for a fixed interval, than the job-moving 
rate.15  Define m = 1 when a worker moves at least once, and m = 0 when the worker does not 
move during a fixed interval. When the interval is short, then Pr(m = 1) = 1-exp[-θ], where Pr(m 
= 1) denotes the probability of job moving at least once. The ratio of the derivatives of the job 
moving probability Pr(m = 1), with respect to two job attributes (in our application, w and t), and 
                                                          
14 Note that k/p may take any positive value. 
15 The job moving rate θ is defined, in the theoretical model, for an infinitely small period. With respect to 
job mobility, few workers move more than once during a month, so monthly data are ideal. Given bi-
annual data, as will be used in our application, multiple job moves during a fixed period cannot be 
distinguished from single job moves. 
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the ratio of the derivatives of instantaneous utility flow v, with respect to these two job attributes, 
can be shown to be equal to each other. Gronberg and Reed (1994) and Van Ommeren et al. 
(2000) derived this result for job moving rate θ, but it can easily be shown to extend to job 
moving probabilities, as there is a one-to-one relationship between job moving rates and job 
moving probabilities. Hence: 
 
1Pr( 1) Pr( 1)/D
m mMWP t
D w
−∂ = ∂ == ∂ ∂ . (6) 
 
Equation (5) implies that workers' MWP equals the ratio of the marginal effects of commuting 
time and wage on job moving behaviour. The intuition of this result is similar to the intuition for 
on-the-job search. Consequently, (5) and (6) imply that: 
 
1 1Pr( 1) Pr( 1) Pr( 1) Pr(/ /D D
s s mMWP t t
D w D
− −∂ = ∂ = ∂ = ∂ == =∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
1)m
w
. (7) 
 
In conclusion, workers' MWP for commuting time can be derived from the marginal effects of 
wage and commuting time on on-the-job search behaviour as well as on job moving behaviour, 
using the same underlying assumptions. 
 
2.3 Estimation method 
In our data, workers report whether they search or not for another job. It is then useful to 
introduce the latent variable search intention s*, where s and s* are related by: s = 1 if s* > 0 and 
s = 0 if s* ≤ 0. We relate the search intention to explanatory variables by s* = β'Xs+us, where β is 
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a vector of unknown coefficients, Xs is a vector of explanatory variables and us is an independent 
random variable with expectation 0. For job moving, a similar latent-variable framework can be 
used, so m* = η'Xm+ud, and m = 1 if m* > 0 and m = 0 if m* ≤ 0.  
The specifications of Xs and Xm are determined by theoretical considerations. Recall that 
the utility function v can be written as v(wH-αwt). This indicates that Xs and Xm may include the 
daily wage, wH, and the commuting time interacted with the hourly wage, wt. Let βt and ηt be the 
parameters associated with the interaction of commuting time and hourly wage in the job search 
and the job mobility model. Let βw and ηw be the parameters associated with the daily wage. The 
ratio of the marginal effects of the interaction between the hourly wage and commuting time and 
the daily wage on search, as well as job moving, behaviour is then equal to βt/βw and ηt/ηw, 
respectively, and thus, using (7): 
 
( / ) / ( / ) / /t w t wMWP w H w H w Hβ β η η α= = = − . (8) 
 
Estimates of (βt/βw)w/H, as well as (ηt/ηw)w/H, can therefore be interpreted as workers' MWP for 
commuting. To interpret the results, we will follow the literature, by defining workers' marginal 
commuting costs (MCC) as the number of hours H times MWP, so MCC 
= ( / ) ( / )t w t ww wβ β η η=  and MCC/w = βt/βw = ηt/ηw . Workers' MCC is easier to interpret than 
MWP, as it shows how much, at the margin, a worker is willing to pay per day to reduce his/her 
daily commute. 
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3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
3.1 Data 
We have seen that workers' valuation of commuting time can be derived from data on job search, 
as well as job moving, behaviour. The data requirements to estimate job search and job moving 
models are similar, but not identical. Job search behaviour relates to an activity, which may, or 
may not, result in a job move. Job moving is usually preceded by a job search activity (but not 
always, as employers also approach workers, see Mekkelholt, 1993), but this job search activity 
will frequently not be recorded in the survey available to the analyst (as it falls outside the search 
period defined by the survey).  
In case of on-the-job search, one needs data about job search at a certain moment in time 
(or about search during a short interval); for job moving, one needs to follow workers over time, 
so one has to observe a worker at least twice. This implies that there is usually less information 
about job mobility than about job search. 
Our data derive from the biannual Dutch labour supply panel survey (OSA). We select 
seven waves of data (for the years 1990 to 2002) containing the information that we require. In 
total, we have 18,450 annual observations on job search activity for 8,937 different workers. Job 
search is defined here as any job search activity in the month before the interview. To observe 
job moving, we use information about workers observed in the consecutive surveys. We have 
9,513 valid observations on job moving for 4,544 different workers. The mean net hourly wage 
in our sample is € 9.17. For males, the mean net wage is € 9.57, whereas for females the mean 
net wage is € 8.61.  
In our data set, we do not observe the daily number of working hours (but only the 
weekly number of hours). From other data sources (WBO, 2002), we find the national mean of 
daily working hours, which is 7.8 for males, 6.0 for females and 7.0 for the whole sample. In 
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particular, for males the variation in daily working hours is small, but, also, for females this 
variation is small, with few female workers working less than 5 or more than 8 hours (see 
Hamermesh, 1996, who reports similar results for Germany). Hence, we may impute the gender-
specific national means of the daily working hours, for the individual daily working hours, as the 
effect of the measurement error is small.16 Given the imputed daily working hours, and 
information about the monthly wage and weekly working hours, which are both available in the 
survey, the daily wage has been calculated. 
We measure on-the-job search (defined as occurring in the month before the interview) 
and job moving as dichotomous variables. The mean (monthly) on-the-job search rate is 0.08, the 
annual job moving rate is 0.10 and the daily commuting time is 0.77 hours (which corresponds to 
a 23 minutes one-way commute, in line with other studies for the Netherlands). In our data, the 
correlation between job moving and search, in a certain month during the same year, is only 
0.19, whereas the correlation between search in year t and job moving in year t+2 (the next 
                                                          
16 Note that random measurement error in the number of hours worked per day induces a downward bias 
in the estimate of βw, and therefore an upward bias in MCC. Note that βw refers to the product of H, which 
is observed with error, and the hourly wage w, which is observed, so we therefore assume to be observed 
without measurement error. In this case, the bias in the estimated βw (as a proportion of the true value) is 
equal to 2 2 2/ ( )H H wσ σ σ+  approximately, where 2Hσ  and 2wσ  refer to the variances of hours and wage, 
respectively (the approximation is exact, given the absence of other control variables, see Verbeek, 2001, 
p. 121). In our data, 2wσ  = 9.67 (9.92 for males; 8.82 for females), whereas, according to the WBO 
(2002), 2Hσ  = 0.83 (0.64 for males; 1.04 for females). Hence, the bias is only 8.5% of the true value 
(6.4% for males; 12% for females). As we control for other variables, it is plausible that the bias is less; 
we control for the presence of a partner, children, and industry, which likely strongly reduces unobserved 
variation in working hours per day, but these variables are known not to have as much explanatory power 
for the wage rate. 
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period available in our data) is even lower (0.08). This indicates that job search and moving data 
are statistically quite different concepts.  
Figure 1 shows the bivariate relationship between on-the-job search and commuting time. 
It appears that there is a strong, positive relationship between search and commuting time: search 
intensity almost doubles when the commute increases from less than 0.6 hours to more than 2 
hours per day. The bivariate relationship between job moving and commuting time is similar.  
 
3.2 Empirical results 
On-the-job search 
We have estimated a range of discrete choice models for job search. A large number of 
explanatory variables are available and are used as control variables. We will provide here the 
results based on a standard probit and random-effects probit model. In the standard probit model, 
the panel structure of the data is ignored. However, it may be the case that some workers are 
more likely to search, for reasons not included in the model. This is potentially problematic as 
the theoretical model assumes homogeneous individuals. For this reason, we also estimate a 
random effects model, which allows for a correlation ρ between the random errors of the same 
individual. The results are presented in Table 1. We will focus on the estimates of βw and βh, as 
well as the estimate for MCC, summarised in Table 4. For the standard probit model, we find that 
βw = -0.0055 and βh = 0.011, so MCC/w = 2.01. For the random effects model, MCC/w = 2.06, 
so, essentially, the same result is obtained. This suggests that the empirical results, obtained for a 
sample of heterogeneous workers, are not so sensitive to the assumption of homogeneity. This is 
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important because the dynamic search approach, and therefore the derivation of MCC/w, 
assumes that workers have identical utility functions.17  
We find that, at the margin, workers' costs associated with commuting time are about 
twice the net wage. Evaluated at the mean wage, this implies a MCC of € 18 (see Table 4), with a 
standard error (s.e.) of € 3 to € 4, depending on the type of model used.18 In our data, the mean 
commuting time is 0.73 hours, with a standard deviation of 0.58. Hence, a one standard-
deviation increase in the commuting time increases the MCC by about € 10.80, on average. 
We have estimated all models separately by gender (Table 2), also. In the standard probit, 
for males, βw = -0.0052 and βh = 0.0074, so the value of MCC/w = 1.41(standard error = 0.48). In 
the random effects model, for males, we find MCC/w = 1.43. For females, MCC/w is equal to 
2.24 and 2.25, respectively.19 These estimates imply that workers' MCC is around € 14 for males 
and around € 19 for females, suggesting that the MCC is higher for females than for males. 
However, the difference in these estimates is statistically insignificant at the 5% level.20 
                                                          
17 We have also estimated worker fixed-effects logit models, which identify the coefficients of interest by 
controlling for unobserved worker characteristics, so the homogeneity assumption is even less 
problematic. However, given fixed effects, there is too little variation in the data to estimate βt/βw 
precisely, because the standard error of βt is large, relative to its point estimate (t = 0.740). However, the 
point estimate has the correct sign (negative). 
18 The standard error is calculated using the delta method, see Goldberger (1991). 
19 Note that measurement error in the number of daily working hours, H, is more present for females than 
for males (for whom variation in H is much smaller). Random measurement error in H decreases the 
estimate of βw. This suggests that the larger value of MCC for females may be partially due to 
measurement error in H. Our investigation of this issue, based on data for job mobility, as discussed later 
on, suggests however that this is not, or hardly, the case. 
20 The (weighted) average of these gender-specific estimates is € 15.40, so the (weighted) average of the 
models, estimated separately for gender, is (slightly) lower than the point estimate of the model, based on 
the pooled observations. 
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According to the labour economics literature, it is plausible that females with children 
and an employed (male) partner have higher MCC (e.g., Wales, 1978). The main reason is that 
these females have a higher value of non-working time. This is consistent with the stylised fact 
that females with children and an employed husband are less likely to work and, if they work, 
they are more likely to work part-time. We have therefore re-estimated the same model, based on 
a sample of females with children (and with an employed partner)(see Table 3). We find that 
MCC/w is 3.35 (with a standard error of 1.18). So, in line with this hypothesis, the MCC is 
substantially higher for this group, but the estimate is rather imprecise due to the limited number 
of observations. We have therefore re-examined this result by estimating the same model for the 
whole sample, and including interaction effects for females with children. According to these 
results, the MCC/w for this group of females is about 50% larger, but this difference is not 
statistically different. Hence, our results suggest that the MCC of this group is in the range of € 9 
to € 30.  
 
On-the-job mobility 
We have also estimated models of job mobility, in order to estimate ηt and ηw. The full results are 
given in Tables 5 and 6, and summarised in Table 7. In essence, the results are the same as for 
on-the-job search. Estimates of MCC vary from between € 13 and €17. Again, allowing for 
worker-specific unobserved heterogeneity does not change the results. The only difference is that 
the results based on mobility data suggest that females have a slightly lower MCC than males, 
but this difference is far from statistically significant. Similar to the results for on-the-job search, 
we have also examined whether females with children and an employed partner have a higher 
MCC. This appears to be the case, but the difference is far from being statistically significant. 
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Combining the MCC estimates of search and mobility 
We have estimated separate models using information on on-the-job search as well as 
information on job moving behaviour. Both models give information on the size of MCC. It 
appears that the difference in the MCC estimates of the job search and job mobility models is 
small and statistically insignificant. For example, given the model where observations of males 
and females are pooled, the difference in the estimates is € -2.19  for the standard probit model 
and € -2.21  for the random-effects probit model. Hence, the estimates based on the job search 
and job-moving approaches are consistent with each other, and differ only due to random error. 
The mean size effect can therefore be calculated by the weighted average of the two estimates, 
where the weights are based on the inverse of the variance of the estimates.21 The mean effect 
based on the standard probit models is €17.09 with a standard error of € 2.31, whereas for the 
random-effects probit model, the MCC is only slightly higher (€ 17.60; s.e. € 2.59). Hence, as 
before, a one standard-deviation increase in the commuting time increases the MCC by about € 
10. 
Using the same methodology but distinguishing now between females with children (and 
an employed husband) and the rest of the sample, we find that the MCC for females with 
children is € 18.46 (s.e. 2.71) and for the rest of the sample is € 15.68 (s.e. 2.36). Hence, the 
results suggest that females with children have a higher MCC than other workers, but a larger 
sample of observations is needed to clarify this issue, as the difference between these estimates is 
not statistically significant. 
 
3.3 Robustness analyses 
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We have repeated the analyses many times with different sets of control variables, and found that 
the results remain robust.22 We have also re-estimated models for observations for a selected 
range of the reported hourly wage, to reduce potential measurement error in the reported wage. 
The results remain robust. Furthermore, we have re-examined the functional form of the two 
main variables of interest: the daily wage wH and the commuting time t. Recall that theory 
suggested that v = v(wH-αwt), so, in the empirical specification of the model, wH as well as wt 
have been used. Note, however, that v(wH-αwt) represents the same preferences as, for example, 
v(log(wH-αwt)), where log denotes the natural logarithm. The latter can be approximated by 
v(log(wH)-αt/H), for αt/H much smaller than one. The latter approximation amounts to the 
assumption that daily commuting costs are small, relative to the daily wage. Hence, the 
instantaneous utility depends, then, on the logarithm of the daily wage and the level of 
commuting time (relative to the number of working hours H). Hence, we have re-estimated all 
models using a specification based on the logarithm of the daily wage and the level of commuting 
time, as well as models that include the daily wage, the logarithm of the wage, commuting time 
interacted with wage, and commuting time. We find now that point estimates of MCC, evaluated 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
21 These weights are optimal when the difference in the estimates is entirely due to random error. The 
standard error of this mean is computed as the square root of the sum of the inverse variance weights.  
22 We have excluded a range of regressors, as well as included additional regressors such as elapsed job 
duration and region (12 provinces), but the results remain robust. Note that the control variables in the 
search model control for two types of confounding effects: firstly, workers face different wage 
distributions, and, depending on the level of the current wage relative to the expected wage of the new 
job, they will decide to search; secondly, workers face different arrival rates p(s), even for the same level 
of search effort, which will affect their search decision. Hence, each control variable controls both for 
differences in the wage distribution and for differences in the job arrival rates. To address this issue, we 
have estimated a standard hedonic wage model and have used the difference between the observed and 
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at the mean, are systematically larger (about 10% to 32% in absolute value) than reported above, 
but these new point estimates are all within the 95% confidence interval of the results presented 
above. We have compared the fitness criteria of the estimated models with those reported in 
section 3.2, but the fitness criteria are very similar.23  
 Finally, we have estimated bivariate probit models, which allow for correlation between 
the unobserved error terms in the two equations for job search and job moving. It appears that the 
results are almost identical: workers' MCC changes only slightly, whereas the standard errors are 
hardly reduced. In conclusion, our results are robust, and we have reported the point estimates 
that are the most conservative.24 
Our estimates for α are lower than the implied value obtained by Manning (2003a) using 
information on on-the-job mobility in the U.K.25 Our point estimates, however, exceed the point 
estimates obtained by Van Ommeren and Hazans (2008) using information on job search for 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the expected wage, viz. the residuals of the hedonic wage model, instead of the observed wage. It appears 
that the results are almost identical. 
23 For most models, the fitness criteria are slightly better for the model specification reported in the tables 
above than for the alternative specification. It appears however that the alternative specification is 
consistently less appropriate for females. 
24 We have found that estimates of workers' MCC are about €17 per hour. Our findings, therefore, 
indicate that the costs associated with commuting are substantial. It is plausible that workers will be 
compensated in the labour and/or housing market. In case of full compensation (via higher wages and 
house prices), commuting time should not have any effect on on-the-job activity or on-the-job mobility 
when one does not control for wages and house prices (Manning, 2003a). Indeed, estimates not shown 
here imply that on-the-job search activity, as well as job mobility, strongly increase with commuting time, 
when one does not control for wages (and house prices). So, on average, workers are partially 
compensated for their commuting costs. This result is in line with the common result: that estimates based 
on hedonic wage models find that wages are not so responsive to the length of workers' commuting time. 
25 Our estimates are also lower than those obtained by Stutzer and Frey (2004), who estimate, for 
Germany, that α is equal to 0.4, using subjective information on well being. 
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Lithuania. In Van Ommeren and Hazans (2008), it was argued that to determine a worker's value 
of job attributes via information on job search would be more accurate than using information 
about job mobility. In particular, it was argued that if the job attribute was correlated to 
involuntary job mobility, then the use of information on job mobility will bias the results. In that 
study, the authors suggested that the relative high value for α, obtained by Manning (2003a), 
may be due to the use of job mobility data (instead of job search data). Since we find almost 
identical results for α in our study, given information about job mobility and job search, it 
appears that, at least in the case of commuting time, there is no fundamental difference with 
respect to the choice of analysing job search or job move data. We do not have an explanation 
why our estimates are in between those of Manning (2003a) and Van Ommeren and Hazans 
(2008), although it should be emphasised that those studies focus on the U.K. and Lithuania, 
respectively. 
Our findings are not so straightforward as to compare with those of transport studies that 
focus on the time component of commuting costs. In that literature, it is hotly debated whether 
time costs are small or large, relative to the wage rate. A usual finding is that the disutility of one 
hour of commuting is less than the net gross hourly wage (Small, 1992).26 Our estimates indicate 
that the overall marginal costs of commuting are about twice the net wage, suggesting that other 
costs (monetary costs, opportunity costs of car use, etc.) play an important role at the margin. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have estimated workers' marginal costs associated with the length of the 
commute. We have argued, in the introduction, that these costs play an important role in 
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economic theory regarding the spatial structure of the economy. Perhaps surprisingly, there is 
little known about the level of these costs. We used a dynamic model approach, which allows us 
to estimate the total marginal costs associated with commuting time. The approach has been 
applied to observations on job moving, as well as job search, behaviour in the Netherlands, using 
panel data. The application of panel data approaches partially addresses one of the limitations of 
the dynamic model approach used, which requires that individuals have identical utility functions 
(Gronberg and Reed, 1994). We demonstrate that workers' marginal costs associated with 
commuting time are about € 17 per hour, and that these results are hardly sensitive to the 
specification used. 
Our estimates imply that, at the margin, workers' commuting costs are substantial. For 
example, when the marginal costs of commuting are € 17 per hour, then an employed worker is 
indifferent to a job offer that increases his daily commute by one standard deviation (35 
minutes), yet, at the same time, increases his daily net wage by about € 9.91, so about the net 
wage for one hour of work.  
Our finding of substantial marginal costs of commuting is consistent with the observation 
that workers' average commuting time is short, whereas, at the same time, there is a large labour 
economics literature which argues that there is a large variation in wages offered to job seekers, 
and that non-wage characteristics may be relevant (Burdett and Mortensen, 1998). If the costs 
associated with commuting were small, as, for example, implied by Calfee and Winston (1998), 
workers would be willing to accept, at least temporarily, much longer commuting times than 
observed in the data. In our (representative) sample, the average commuting time is 23 minutes 
(one-way), and only 8% of workers commute more than 60 minutes (one-way). This suggests 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
26 However, Kahneman et al. (2004) show that, on average, workers feel slightly better during work than 
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that the marginal costs associated with commuting are indeed substantial. 
Our estimation approach is consistent with search-theoretical approaches applied in the 
‘wasteful commuting’ literature, and it is interesting to apply our results to that literature. For 
example, the study by Van Ommeren and Van der Straaten (2008) uses a theoretical model 
similar to that used in the current paper. In that paper, as in this one, it is also argued that 
workers have to search for jobs, and it is shown that, due to a finite job arrival rate, workers are 
not able to minimise the length of their commute. Their empirical results imply that, on average, 
about 40% of the daily commuting time (46 minutes per day) is due to job search frictions. Using 
a marginal commuting cost of € 17 per hour, this implies that the daily costs of ‘wasteful 
commuting’ are, on average, € 5 per commuter. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
during commuting, which is considered stressful, suggesting the opposite. 
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Table 1. Probit estimates of on-the-job search 
 Standard probit  Random effects probit 
Variable Coefficient St. err.  Coefficient St. err. 
Daily wage -0.0055 0.0009  -0.0061 0.0010 
Hourly wage*commute 0.0110 0.0025  0.0125 0.0027 
Very low education -0.1780 0.0738  -0.2064 0.0898 
Low education -0.1213 0.0339  -0.1439 0.0421 
High education 0.2654 0.0376  0.3081 0.0466 
Very high education 0.3107 0.0604  0.3757 0.0734 
Hours per week -0.0064 0.0020  -0.0081 0.0023 
Male 0.1940 0.0409  0.2176 0.0494 
Age 0.2948 0.0708  0.3237 0.0840 
Age2 -0.0852 0.0123  -0.0957 0.0150 
Children 0.0014 0.0139  -0.0050 0.0167 
Partner -0.2215 0.0449  -0.2511 0.0531 
Employed partner 0.0766 0.0464  0.0943 0.0553 
Monthly wage partner -0.0265 0.0298  -0.0349 0.0344 
ρ    0.2554 0.0255 
MCC/w -2.01 0.39  -2.06 0.44 
Number of observations 18,450  18,450 
Note: industry and year controls are not reported. 
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Table 2. Probit estimates of on-the-job search by gender 
 Males Females 
 Standard Random effects Standard Random effects 
Variable Coeff. St. err. Coeff. St. err. Coeff. St. err. Coeff. St. err. 
Daily wage -0.0052 0.0011 -0.0058 0.0012 -0.0082 0.0017 -0.0089 0.0019 
Hourly 
w.*commute 
0.0074 0.0027 0.0083 0.0035 0.0184 0.0038 0.0202 0.0045 
Very low edu -0.1866 0.0913 -0.2012 0.1161 -0.1084 0.1267 -0.1414 0.1415 
Low edu -0.0706 0.0439 -0.0799 0.0562 -0.2101 0.0545 -0.2348 0.0646 
High edu 0.2161 0.0520 0.2676 0.0666 0.3232 0.0555 0.3520 0.0641 
Very high edu 0.2531 0.0792 0.3231 0.0995 0.3811 0.0959 0.4309 0.1121 
Hours per week -0.0131 0.0040 -0.0159 0.0048 -0.0107 0.0027 -0.0120 0.0030 
Age 0.4418 0.0993 0.5096 0.1232 0.1696 0.1071 0.1700 0.1205 
Age2 -0.1109 0.0170 -0.1293 0.0216 -0.0635 0.0192 -0.0670 0.0220 
Children 0.0058 0.0183 -0.0019 0.0229 -0.0060 0.0239 -0.0105 0.0271 
Partner -0.1266 0.0594 -0.1441 0.0726 -0.3699 0.0812 -0.3978 0.0924 
Employed p. 0.0301 0.0575 0.0517 0.0683 0.0395 0.0986 0.0427 0.1154 
Monthly wage p. 0.0628 0.0530 0.0544 0.0588 0.0080 0.0418 0.0081 0.0488 
ρ   0.2925 0.0332   0.1797 0.0422 
MCC/w -1.41 0.48 -1.43 0.55 -2.24 0.49 -2.25 0.53 
Number of obs. 10,748 10,748 7,702 7,702  
Note: industry and year controls are not reported. 
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Table 3. Probit model of on-the-job search: females with children and employed husband 
 Coefficient Standard error Coefficient Standard error 
Daily wage -0.0071 0.0026 -0.0081 0.0032 
Hourly wage*commute 0.0239 0.0066 0.0274 0.0084 
Very low education -0.0889 0.1923 -0.0992 0.2438 
Low education -0.2257 0.0893 -0.2692 0.1149 
High education 0.2661 0.0906 0.2973 0.1111 
Very high education 0.2269 0.1806 0.2576 0.2319 
Hours per week -0.0019 0.0047 -0.0024 0.0057 
Age 0.1811 0.3250 0.1385 0.3700 
Age2 -0.0529 0.0544 -0.0500 0.0628 
Children 0.0461 0.0466 0.0446 0.0593 
Monthly wage partner 0.0135 0.0538 0.0075 0.0667 
ρ   0.2685 0.0736 
MCC/w -3.35 1.18 -3.39 1.30 
Number of observations 3,195 3,195 
Note: industry and year controls are not reported. 
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Table 4. Summary based on job search 
 All observations Males Females 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 probit r.e. probit probit r.e. probit probit r.e. probit 
βw -0.0055 -0.0061 -0.0052 -0.0058 -0.0082 -0.0089 
s.e. (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0017) (0.0019) 
βt 0.0110 0.0125 0.0074 0.0083 0.0184 0.0202 
s.e. (0.0022) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0035) (0.0038) (0.0045) 
MCC/w -2.01 -2.06 -1.41 -1.43 -2.24 -2.25 
s.e. (0.39) (0.44) (0.48) (0.55) (0.57) (0.56) 
MCC  -18.43 € -18.89 € -13.49 € -13.68 € -19.29 € -19.24 € 
s.e. (3.57 €) (4.03 €) (4.59 €) (5.26 €) (4.91 €) (4.85 €)  
Note: MCC is calculated at the gender-specific mean wage w. 
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Table 5. Probit estimates of job moving 
 Standard probit Random effects probit 
Variable Coefficient Standard 
error 
 Coefficient Standard 
error 
Daily wage -0.0098 0.0014  -0.0108 0.0016 
Hourly wage * commute 0.0174 0.0033  0.0198 0.0040 
Very low education -0.1566 0.1059  -0.1573 0.1181 
Low education -0.1595 0.0475  -0.1639 0.0555 
High education 0.0451 0.0571  0.0371 0.0681 
Very high education 0.1154 0.0983  0.0805 0.1174 
Hours per week -0.0021 0.0030  -0.0013 0.0034 
Male 0.1652 0.0616  0.1410 0.0724 
Age -0.1937 0.1100  -0.2272 0.1281 
Age2 -0.0163 0.0193  -0.0124 0.0228 
Children 0.0098 0.0205  -0.0757 0.0116 
Partner -0.0580 0.0686  0.0099 0.0242 
Employed p. -0.0645 0.0662  -0.0874 0.0807 
Monthly wage p. 0.0792 0.0437  -0.0654 0.0749 
ρ    0.2783 0.0528 
MCC/w -1.76 0.33  -1.82 0.37 
Number of observations 9,513  9,513 
Note: industry and year controls are not reported. 
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Table 6. Probit estimates of job move by gender 
 Males Females 
 Standard Random effects Standard Random effects 
 Variable Coeff. St. err. Coeff. St. err. Coeff. St. err. Coeff. St. err. 
Daily wage -0.0073 0.0017 -0.0081 0.0021 -0.0183 0.0028 -0.0197 0.0029 
Hourly w.*commute 0.0132 0.0041 0.0141 0.0052 0.0284 0.0056 0.0330 0.0068 
Very low education -0.1680 0.1330 -0.1936 0.1484 -0.0081 0.1833 -0.0030 0.2054 
Low education -0.1158 0.0625 -0.1310 0.0745 -0.1706 0.0760 -0.1955 0.0845 
High education 0.0381 0.0803 0.0430 0.0965 0.0462 0.0845 0.0433 0.1006 
Very high education -0.0920 0.1319 -0.0904 0.1630 0.3152 0.1561 0.3518 0.1739 
Hours per week 0.0058 0.0069 0.0045 0.0074 -0.0061 0.0040 -0.0070 0.0044 
Age -0.2097 0.1536 -0.2400 0.1836 -0.1785 0.1684 -0.1908 0.1897 
Age2 -0.0105 0.0263 -0.0111 0.0323 -0.0181 0.0304 -0.0205 0.0345 
Job duration -0.0698 0.0141 -0.0601 0.0152 -0.1027 0.0175 -0.0976 0.0187 
Children -0.0271 0.0277 -0.0305 0.0339 0.0523 0.0351 0.0518 0.0402 
Partner 0.0592 0.0912 0.0447 0.1061 -0.1801 0.1258 -0.1900 0.1456 
Employed partner -0.0916 0.0842 -0.0852 0.0969 -0.2020 0.1454 -0.2128 0.1644 
Monthly wage p. 0.1687 0.0837 0.1671 0.0982 0.1321 0.0601 0.1329 0.0659 
ρ   0.2830 0.0508   0.2460 0.0687 
MCC/w -1.82 0.55 -1.76 0.63 -1.55 0.30 -1.67 0.34 
Number of obs. 5,725 3,788  
Note: industry and year controls are not reported. 
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Table 7. Summary based on job moving 
 All observations Males Females 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 probit r.e. probit probit r.e. probit probit r.e. probit 
ηw -0.0098 -0.0108 -0.0073 -0.0081 -0.0183 -0.0197 
s.e. (0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0028) (0.0029) 
ηt 0.0174 0.0198 0.0132 0.0141 0.0284 0.0330 
s.e. (0.0033) (0.0040) (0.0041) (0.0052) (0.0056) (0.0068) 
MCC/w -1.76 -1.82 -1.82 -1.76 -1.55 -1.67 
s.e. (0.33) (0.37) (0.55) (0.63) (0.30) (0.34) 
MCC -16.14 € -6.68 € -17.42 € -16.84 € -13.34 € -14.38 € 
s.e. (3.03 €) (3.39 €) (5.26 €) (6.03 €) (2.58 €) (2.93 €) 
Note: MCC is calculated at the gender-specific mean wage w. 
 
 
 
